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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-




Case No. 18051 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Michael George Durant, appeals from 
the conviction and judgment of Aggravated Arson, a felony in 
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-103 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITIO~ IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried and convicted in a bench 
trial of Aggravated Arson, a felony in the second degree, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County,. State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, 
presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years, the judge having lowered the 
penalty to the next lowest category, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-3-402 (1953), as amended. 
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RELIRF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict and findings of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent essentially adopts the facts as 
presented by the appellant with one exception. The appellant 
alludes to the "appellant anrl the owner" residing in the house 
which was burned. While testimony found on page 19 of the 
trial transcript (page 48 of the record of this case) 
indicates that Carl Rose "had the lease" or "rental" to the 
house, such indicates that he was a tenant in the house and 
did not own the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ARSON WAS PROPER. 
The statute under which the appellant was convicted, 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-103 (1953), as amended, provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson 
if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) A habitable structure: or 
(b) Any structure or vehicle when any 
person not a participant in the offense is 
in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the 
second degree. 
-2-
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Under the terms of the statute, the burning of any habitable 
structure or any structure or vehicle where another person is 
in that structure or vehicle is proscribed, regardless of the 
ownership of the structure or vehicle. It having been proved 
that the house burned in the instant case was a "habitable 
structure," the appellant and Carl Rose being residents 
thereof, and that the appellant burned the house, the 
appellant's conviction under the above statute was proper. 
The appellant claims that in burning down the house, 
he was acting as an agent of Carl Rose, whom it is posited was 
the "owner" of the house. According to the appellant, an 
agent may not be guilty of a crime of which the principal 
could not have been found guilty. Here, the appellant states, 
since the principal, Carl Rose, as "owner" of the property, 
could not have been proper~y convicted of Aggravated Arson, 
neither could his agent, the appellant, be properly found 
guilty of the crime. 
The appellant reaches the conclusion that the common 
law rule that a person may not be guilty of Arson by burning 
his own property extends to the statutory crime of Aggravated 
Arson through a creative twisting of the m~aning of the word 
"unlawful" in both the Aggravated Arson statute, set out 
supra, and in the Arson statute, Utah Code Ann., S 76-6-102 
-3-
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(1953), as amended.I That statute provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) A person is guilty of arson if, under 
circumstances not amounting to aggravated 
arson, by means of fire or explosives, he 
unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
(a) Any property with intention of 
defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) The property of another. 
The appellant asserts that since the term "unlawful" is not 
statutorily defined, it must be defined here in the terms of 
the other elements of the crime of arson. In other words, the 
"unlawful" conduct proscribed in the Arson statute must be 
either the burning of any property with the intention of 
insurance fraud or the burning of the property of another. 
Since there was no proof of insurance fraud in the instant 
case, the appellant posits that the definition of "unlawful" 
conduct under the Arson statute must, by default, be the 
burning of the property of ~another. Here, then, the appellant 
asserts that the definition of "unlawful" in the Arson statute 
must be "the burning of the property of another." 
The appellant's argument is next dependent on 
incorporating the definition of "unlawful" reached under the 
lunder Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-105 (1953), as 
amended, common law crimes are abolished. so, too, 
presumably, are common law defenses. Thus, in order to assert 
the defense that an owner of property cannot be guilty of 
arson by burning it, the defendant must assert a statutory 
defense to the statutory crime. 
-4-
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above analysis of the Arson statute into the Aggravated Arson 
statute, where •unlawful" damage is a necessary element of the 
crime. Accoroing to the appellant, if an "unlawful" act means 
"the burning of the property of another" (in the Arson 
statute), and the Aggravated Arson statute includes as an 
element the "unlawful" damage, by fire or explosives, of a 
habitable structure or an inhabited structure or vehicle, then 
by definition the burned habitable structure or inhabited 
structure or vehicle must be the property of someone other 
than the actor in order for the actor to be guilty of 
Aggravated Arson. Thus, since Carl Rose was purportedly the 
"owner" of the burned property and the appellant his "agent," 
the argument goes, neither can be found guilty of Aggravated 
Arson. 
The appellant's theory is meritless for several 
: 
reasons. First, the appellant's assertion that since the word 
"unlawful" is not statutorily defined, it must take its 
/ 
meaning from the other elements of the crime (of arson) is 
ludicrous. Taken to its logical conclusion, the appellant's 
argument would render the word "unlawful" useless surplusage 
in each statute in which it appears, an interpretation which 
stretches the imagination in light of the overwhelming number 
of statutes in which the requirement that the act be 
"unlawful" is enumerated as a separate element. It is 
illogical that the Legislature would, through use of the word 
-s-
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"unlawful," set forth a separate element of a crime that would 
essentially be identical to the other elements of the crime. 
Indeed, the word "unlawful" would take on a different meaning 
in each s ta tu te in which it is used. Su ch would be an 
unnecessary repetition of the statutory elements, would add 
nothing, and make no sense. 
Clearly, the statutory meaning of the word 
"unlawful" must be drawn from some other source than the 
statute in which it appears. The logical rendering of the 
word's statutory meaning is "without justification," the word 
"justification" drawing its meaning from Part Four of Chapter 
Two of Title 76 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
which includes within its ambit numerous justifications which 
exclude criminal responsibility; the defense of persons or 
property, an actor's reasonable actions in fulfillment of 
governmental duties, reasonable discipline of minors by 
parents, guardians, teachers, or others in loco parentis, 
reasonable discipline of persons in lawful custody, and other 
justifications.2 While respondent recognizes that this 
2The requirement that the act committed be 
"unlawful" in order for it to be criminal is found in the 
statutes outlawing Mayhem, Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-105 (1953), 
as amended; Criminal Homicide, Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-201 
(1953), as amended; Criminal Mischief, Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-6-106(2) (1953), as amended; and Robbery, Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, without any statutory 
definition of the word "unlawful." Part Two of Section Six, 
Chapter 76, which deals with Burglary, Burglary of a Vehicle, 
and Criminal Trespass, a necessary element of each of which 
-6-
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definition, too, renders use of the word nunlawful" surplusage 
to a degree, such a definition is logical in light of its use 
throughout the criminal code. In any case, as unfortunate as 
it is that the Legislature has not provided a statutory 
definition of the word "unlawful," the respondent submits that 
the inferences drawn by the aopellant from the absence of a 
definition are erroneous. 
Even assuming that the appellant's logic that 
definition of the word "unlawful" can be drawn by reference to 
the statute in which the word appears is correct, 
is either "unlawfully" remaining or entering on property, 
gives the following definition: 
(3) A person "enters or remains 
unlawfully" in or upon premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at the 
time of the entry or remaining are not 
open to the public and when the actor is 
not otherwise li~ensed or privileged to 
enter or remain on the premises or such 
portion thereof (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-201(3). Significantly, while 
kidnapping does not require that the act be "unlawful," Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-5-301(1) requires as an element that the act 
be •without authority of law." Custodial Interference, which 
also does not require "unlawful" conduct, does require, in 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-303(1), that the act be "without good 
cause." The crime of Rape, which also does not require an 
•unlawful" act, requires that the act be without the victim's 
consent. See Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-402 (1) (1953), as 
amended. Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-102(a) (1953), as amended, 
defines an assault as "an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another." From this 
definition it may be implied that lawful, or justified force 
may be used to do bodily injury to another. Reference to Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-2-401, et seq., explains the circumstances 
under which such force is justified, or "lawful." Thus, read 
in light of the other statutes referred to above, the logic of 
the respondent's interpretation is further shown. 
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the appellant's assertion that the elements of the crime of 
Arson should be incorporated into the requirements of 
Aggravated Arson does not logically follow. Indeed, if the 
appellant's position is adopted, the definition of the word 
"unlawful" in the Aggravated Arson statute can be drawn from 
reference to the elements of that crime as set out in that 
statute. Reference to any other statute, including the Arson 
statute, would be unnecessary. In fact, it would make no more 
sense to adopt the definition of "unlawful" as used in the 
Arson statute to define the same word in the Aggravated Arson 
statute than it would to adopt a different definition of the 
word as it would be used in any of the other statutes in which 
it is found. 
The appellant's tenuous argument that adoption of 
the defense that an owner q?nnot be convicted of Aggravated 
Arson by torching his own property must be "incorporated" as a 
defense to Aggravated Arson through his interpretation of the 
word "unlawful" falls of its own weight. The simple fact that 
the Legislature set out separate elements for each crime 
inveighs heavily against such an assertion. Had the 
Legislature intended the result propounded by the appellant, 
it would have spelled out specifically in the Aggravated Arson 
statute the requirement that for a defendant to be found 
guilty under its provisions, the property burned need be "that 
of another." It dio not do so. The appellant's 
-8-
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•incorporation" theory, then, goes not only against common 
sense, but also is inconsistent with the notion that the 
Legislature spells out what it intends to enact in legislation 
it passes. 
Whether the appellant is seen as an "owner" of the 
burned property,3 or whether the "agency" shield from 
liability proposed by the appellant (neither theory of which 
was proved at trial) is seen as giving the appellant "owner" 
status, he would not be immune from prosecution or a finding 
of guilt under the Aggravated Arson statute. An owner of a 
habitable structure or any structure or vehicle in which any 
other person is present at the time of a fire may be guilty of 
Aggravated Arson if he causes the fire. Such is the clear 
intention of the Legislature. Such is the language of the 
Aggravated Arson statute. : 
The Kansas cases cited by the appellant, State v. 
Christendon, Kan., 468 P.2d 153 ~1970); State v. Parrish, 
Kan., 468 P.2d 143 (1970); and State v. Parrish, Kan., 468 
P.2d 150 (1970), are inapposite in this case. Although the 
Kansas Supreme Court applied the "agency" theory as set out by 
the appellant in his brief and held that the "agent" of an 
owner of burned property could not be held any more liable 
than the owner himself for the crime of first-degree Arson, 
3The fact that the appellant resided in the burned 
structure could be seen as giving him a "possessory interest" 
in the house sufficient to be an "owner" of the property. See 
§ 76-6-101(3), supra. 
-9-
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the court's finding that an owner of property could not be 
found guilty of that crime was based on a Kansas statute which 
specifically required as an element of the crime that the 
property burned be that of another person. The statute under 
which the defendant in that case was prosecuted, Kansas 
Statutes Ann., § 21-581, provided: 
That any person who willfully sets 
fire to or burns or causes to be burned, 
or who aids, counsels or procures the 
burning of any dwelling house, whether 
occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any 
kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other 
outhouse that is parcel thereof, or 
belonging to or adjoining thereto, such 
property being the eroperty of anot~ 
person, shall be guilty of arson in the 
first degree, and upon conviction shall be 
punished by confinement and hard labor for 
not less than two nor more than twenty 
years (Emphasis added). 
As has been emphasized above, unlike the Kansas first-degree 
Arson statute, the Utah Agcµ-avated Arson statute contains no 
ownership requirement for a finding of guilt. To the degree 
that the Kansas statute requires a finding of ownership of the 
burned property, both it and any cases decided under it are 
inapplicable in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant concedes that the Utah Legislature has 
adopted a policy that burning any structure or vehicle when a 
person is inside will subject the actor who burns the 
structure or vehicle guilty of Aggravated Arson, regardless 
-10-
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of ownership of the property. see appellant's brief, page 7. 
His argument that that policy does not extend to the burning 
of •any habitable structure" if that habitable structure is 
owned by the actor is illogical and meritless. The 
Legislature's intent that an actor may be guilty of Aggravated 
Arson by burning his own habitable structure is plain from the 
words of the Aggravated Arson statute. 
It was proved at trial that the appellant did in 
fact intentionally and unlawfully burn a habitable structure. 
This justifies the trial court's finding of guilt of 
Aggravated Arson. For that reason and the other reasons set 
out above, the trial court's finding should be affirmed by 
this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of September, 
1982. 
DAVlD L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~-r-:.--::. ~~ 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Nancy 
Bergeson, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
this 21st day of September, 1982. 
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